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PENALTY CLAUSES IN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
-APPLICABLE LAW AND VALIDITY
ROGER S. UPCHURCH*
The United States sued the Le Roy Dyal Company, to
enforce a liquidated damages clause in a contract between
the defendant and the Commodity Credit Corporation. Un-
der this clause, the government was to recover $3.00 per
hundredweight if the Dyal Co., which was contracting with
CCC to carry out the 1947 Irish potato price support pro-
gram, purchased potatoes from an "ineligible" grower. The
trial judge held the provision to be "in the nature of a
penalty under the circumstances of this case", and gave a
judgment for plaintiff for nominal damages only. The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed on appeal,
on the ground that this was not a penalty, but a reasonable
provision for damages that would be difficult to anticipate
or to prove after breach of the contract. This, the court
derived from "principles of general contract law" rather
than from state law, although it concluded that state law
would lead to the same result in this particular case.'
The principal case points up two interesting problems.
One relates to whether the court was free to apply "general
contract law". The other is the problem of the extent to
which "penalty clauses" in government contracts will be
enforceable.
L The Applicable Law
Under Swift v. Tyson,2 the federal courts had exercised
an independent judgment on issues of general law, with
which the federal government had no concern other than
the fact that the federal courts had jurisdiction. In Erie
R. R. Co. v. Tompkins,3 the majority of the Supreme Court
* 2nd Year Law Student Duke University; A.B. Duke University
1949.
1 United States v. Le Roy Dyal Co., Inc., 186 F.2d 460 (3rd Cir., 1950).
For a similar case see: Rhode Island Discount Go. v. United States, 19
L.W. 2312 (Ct. Cl. 1951), and comment, 39 GEO. L. J. 482 (1951).
2 16 Pet. (U.S.) 1 (1842).
3 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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were of the opinion that the federal courts, in exercising
an independent judgment on these questions of general law,
had long been invading the bailiwick of the states. Under
this latter decision, the federal courts must follow state
law-statutory or case law-on all questions where the
only federal concern is the existence of federal jurisdic-
tion.4
After the Erie case, it was supposed that its doctrine
would not necessarily be limited to cases where federal
jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship; so that,
irrespective of the basis of federal jurisdiction, the federal
judges would look to state decisions on all matters not
peculiarly of federal concern. Of course, under this view,
the federal courts would still continue to exercise an inde-
pendent judgment in construing the federal constitution,
statutes, and treaties; and also they were expected to exer-
cise such a judgment in fields like admiralty5 and interstate
commerce, which are especially entrusted to the federal
government, although no federal statute was controlling.,
Later cases have served to dispel the original belief that
Erie had forever eliminated the term "general law" from
the literature of the federal courts,7 and to articulate lim-
itations which-even if implicit in Erie-have served to
narrow its expected scope. Among these exceptions, and
as to which state law will not be determinative, are:
(1) Cases involving situations where a federal statute
looks expressly to the application of a federal rule,
and
Note, 16 TEx.L.R. 512 (1938), at 514, 520.
Cf. Stevens, Erie RI.. v. Tompkins and the Uniform General Mari-
time Law, 64 HARv.L.R. 246 (1950).
8 Note, 16 TEx.L.R. 512 (1938), at 524, 525.
' Id. at 516: ". . . it remained for the present case to eliminate com-
pletely the term 'general law' from the literature of the federal courts."
And compare the language of Brandeis, J., speaking for the majority of
the court in Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), at page 78:
".. There is no federal general common law. Congress has no
power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State
whether they be local in their nature or 'general', be they commercial
law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution
purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts." But com-
pare the language in the Standard Oil case, infra, note 12.
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(2) Cases in which fundamental federal policy, either
statutory or non-statutory, requires uniformity in
the field including the type of action involved. 8
It seems doubtful that the principal case would come
under the first category. No federal statute has been found
that deals expressly with liquidated damages and the kind
of questions litigated in the principal case. The chief appli-
cability of the "CCC Charter Act"9 seems to be merely that
it established the CCC and thus created an entity with
which the defendant could contract. Certainly the court
in the principal case did not see the pertinence of any fed-
eral statute.
On the other hand, Justice Black, dissenting in Priebe &
Sons, Inc. v. United States,0 argued that the authority to
contract, given to a government corporation by a statute,
means that, unless Congress has especially provided to the
contrary, a government corporation has power to insert in
government contracts clauses which would be considered a
penalty under general principles of contract law. He in-
sisted that the contract should be interpreted in terms of
the Congressional enactments, rather than in terms of
"elusive general contract law"."
In support of Black's argument, it would be said that the
major purpose of Congress was to make sure that the price
support program succeeded. To effectuate that program,
it had established a government corporation in whose
judgment a penalty clause was necessary in this type of
contract. To invalidate that clause would be to contract
judicially the area in which the government corporation
could carry out Congressional policy. In this light, the
statutory grant of power to the CCC to enter into contracts,
would be subject to expansion beyond the sovereignty given
contracting parties under the normal rules of contract law.
In reply to this, it might be argued that the premise is
erroneous in assuming that legitimate interests of the gov-
8 Compare the categories in Note, 59 HARv.L.R. 966 (1946), and in
Reifenberg, Common Law-Federal, 30 Oan.L.R. 164 (1951).
15 U.S.C. §714 (1948).
10 332 U.S. 407 (1947).
Id. at 414.
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ernment would not be protected under the general rules of
law, and that courts must abdicate in favor of government
corporations and agencies in determining what is a penalty.
Later discussion of rules as to liquidated damages will per-
haps shed light on the validity of the premise. More im-
portant, to read so much into a general power given the
government corporation to contract, seems to be torturing
the statute, just as it would be to hold that a state corpora-
tion law, in giving a corporation the power to contract, had
intended that the corporation could exact penalties. Also,
the old maxim could be invoked that penal provisions in
a statute must be clear, though the applicability of this
maxim would be clouded by the fact that the contract gave
the defendant full notice of the penalty to which he became
liable, and thus presumably fulfilled the policy of the maxim.
Another objection to the Black approach is that, while
principles of general contract law may be elusive, so is
legislative intent. What could be less predictable than the
results of judicial inquiry into the minutiae of legislative
documents, none of which probably were really directed to
the problem faced by the court? And if legislative intent
is in question, why is it not feasible to argue that the legis-
lature intended to adopt principles of "general contract
law"? Despite Erie, the concept of general law still ex-
ists;12 and it is certainly possible to infer that Congress
12 See United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 332 U.S. 301,
307-308 (1947): ". . . the Erie decision, which related only to the law
to be applied in exercise of ... [diversity] jurisdiction, had no effect,
and was intended to have none, to bring within the governance of
state law matters exclusively federal, because made so by constitu-
tional or valid congressional command, or others so vitally affecting
interests, powers and relations of the Federal Government as to re-
quire uniform national disposition rather than diversified state rul-
ings. Hence, although federal judicial power to deal with common
law problems was cut down in the realm of liability or its absence
governable by state law, that power remained unimpaired for dealing
independently, wherever necessary or appropriate, with essentially
federal matters, even though Congress has not acted affirmatively
about the specific question.
"In this sense therefore there remains what may be termed, for
want of a better label, an area of 'federal common law', or perhaps
more accurately 'law of independent federal judicial decision', outside
the constitutional realm, untouched by the Erie decision."
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would wish that law to settle issues which were not adverted
to in passing the bill. In other words, the writer fears that
Justice Black's view leads to an unfortunate over-reliance
upon legislative material, and a failure to take advantage
of a system of law which, according to its proponents, rep-
resents judicial empiricism at its best.
Can it be argued that Congress intended to adopt, not
general contract law, but the law of the particular state in
which the action is brought? This leads to the second cate-
gory, and the question whether uniformity is required in
the field in which this particular action lies.
The most applicable case on the points seems to be Priebe
& Sons, Inc. v. United States,13 in which the court construed
and invalidated a liquidated damages clause on the basis
of "general contract law". Similarly, United States v.
Standard Rice Co.,14 United States v. County of Allegheny,15
and S.R.A. v. Minnesota6 have not applied state law in
dealing with government contracts. Some writers have
sought to subsume these cases under a general axiom
that state law should never be applied in dealing with
governmental contracts unless some federal statute ex-
pressly refers to state law.17
One of the arguments for this conclusion is that cases
instituted by the United States'8 should not be decided under
state law, because the United States is very infrequently
a litigant in a state court. It is quite possible, the argument
runs, that, in view of its peculiar nature, the United States
would be treated in a different way from private parties.
Accordingly, there is not a sufficient body of state juris-
prudence to define for most purposes the legal status of the
federal government as a litigant, and to assert what result
'S upra, note 10.
, 323 U.S. 106 (1944).
322 U.S. 174 (1944).
10 327 U.S. 558 (1946).
27 See Reifenberg, op. cit., note 8, at 168.
28 See 36 STAT. 1091 (1911); 48 STAT. 775 (1934); 50 STAT. 738 (1937);
54 STAT. 143 (1940); 28 U.S.C. §41(1). See also, Coffman, LEGAL STATUS
OF GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONs, 7 FED.BAA J. 389 (1946); Osborn v. Bank
of United States, 9 Wheat. (U.S.) 738, 6 L.Ed. 204 (1824); United States
Constitution, Article III, §2.
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would probably ensue in a state court. Therefore, state
law should not be referred to, because to do so would only
immerse the federal judges in the morass of futile attempts
to apply precedents which the state court might itself feel
to be inapplicable to the United States as a litigant.'0
This argument, however, seems extreme. After all, there
is no reason to suppose that the federal government--espe-
cially when carrying on its activities through a government
corporation like the CCC-would be treated differently in
the state courts from individuals or private corporations
involved in similar litigation. While, in general, the United
States government occupies a favored position in dealing
with individuals, why assume a probability that the con-
tracts of its corporations would be treated by state law as
subject to unique rules?20 Any special position that the
government would occupy as a hypothetical litigant in a
state court would be based on other things, like predilections
of a jury.
If state law is to be applied in construing government
contracts, the absence of predictability would mushroom in
instances where the government contract had connections
with several states. For example, what if the contract
were entered into in New York, but related to a factory to
be constructed in California, and the litigation were in a
federal court in North Carolina? If, in litigation affecting
the contract the federal court were compelled to apply the
conflict of laws rules of the North Carolina courts to de-
termine whether California or New York law governed, it
might find a dearth of applicable precedent. So, wherever
there is a conflict of laws element, the lack of predictability
from following state law will be accentuated.
Someone might suggest that it is unfair for individuals
dealing with a government corporation to be subjected to a
rule of contract interpretation other than the familiar state
rule. In reply, it can be pointed out that such a suggestion
assumes what is probably false in most instances, namely
" Compare the argument in Note, 59 H.Auv.L.R. 966, 969-970 (1946).
20 See Coffman, op.cit., note 18, at 405.
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that the individual contracting knows the state rules of law,
and had them in mind at the time of contracting. More-
over, even in dealing with a government corporation, rather
than with the government as such, an individual expects
to be subjected to special rules. After all the criticisms
of government "red tape", are not most persons aware of
the possibility that the government contract and the law
governing it might be sui generis?
Occasionally, some strong state protective policy may
exist in the area in which the government contract is made,
and the federal government may have no strong counter-
vailing policy. For instance, the state might require cer-
tain formalities for the obtaining of a lien, in order to pro-
tect creditors. Should not a government corporation like
the CCC or RFC be subject to that policy? And yet, to
graft such exceptions on the rule that government con-
tracts are to be construed under "general law", would create
a necessity to examine particular situations in order to de-
termine the relative strength of, and the possibility of con-
flict between, state and federal policies. Probably, a pro-
phylactic rule which eliminates the applicability of state
law. and the concomitant need of making these determina-
tions, is justified to economize the time of federal judges
and enhance predictability. The real remedy in such in-
stances would seem to be by careful draftsmanship of the
statutes dealing with the operations of the government in-
strumentality-draftsmanship that would, in some way,
subject the government to the rules of state law where no
federal interest was at stake, and where some strong state
policy was involved.
If general contract law is to govern all government con-
tracts, the Supreme Court will, of course, be the arbiter of
that law. In view of the reluctance of the Supreme Court
to grant certiorari freely, it is quite possible that conflicting
determinations of this general law may exist in different
circuits with little probability of reconciliation. But is the
absence of uniformity between different circuits more fright-
ening than the absence of uniformity as between forty-eight
states? And would the Supreme Court be more troubled by
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petitions for certiorari than if there were available the con-
tention that the lower federal court had failed to heed the
mandate of the Erie case and conform to the governing
state authorities? Moreover, it seems that the argument
for applying the doctrine of the Erie case is partially under-
cut by the absence of possibilities of forum-shopping as
between federal and state courts in situations involving
government contracts, those possibilities being one of the
justifications for the Erie doctrine itself.
In summary, the writer accepts the principle of Supreme
Court cases that government contracts should be ruled by
general contract law, in the absence of some clear statutory
command that some other law is to be applied. He rejects
the notion, derived from Black's dissent in the Prebe case,
that the courts should make a detailed investigation of
legislative history in order to torture statutes into a mani-
festation of legislative intent on a point that Congress never
clearly adverted to.
II. 'enalty" Clauses in a Government Contract
The contract in the principal case called for payment of
$3.00 per hundredweight "as compensation and not as a
penalty" in the event defendant did any one of six named
acts. Defendant purchased potatoes from an "ineligible
grower", one of the acts bringing this "liquidated damages
provision" into operation; and the Court of Appeals held
that the provision was not a penalty, but instead a "reason-
able provision for damages which are exceedingly difficult
to anticipate beforehand or to prove after breach. ' 21
Liquidated damages are said to be a sum fixed by the
parties at the time of entry into the contract, as a reason-
able estimate of the extent of the injury which a breach of
contract will cause.22 In determining the reasonableness
2Supra, note 1, at 463, 464.
-12 WmsToN, CONTRACTS (Rev.Ed., 1938), §776. See also, Iverson,
Contracts-Liquidated Damages Provisions in Government Contracts-
Contracts Entered into During Periods of National Emergency, 21 So.
CAL.L.R. 400 at 401 (1948).
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of this estimate, courts, as in the principal case,23 stress
the unpredictability of prospective damages. Yet it is
agreed that there must be a possibility that some damage
will result.24  Perhaps, as CCC contended, there would be
a possibility of pecuniary loss through CCC's having to
purchase an amount of "eligible" potatoes equivalent to the
amount of "ineligible" ones here involved; or perhaps de-
fendant's breach would tend to inspire imitation by other
potato dealers, interfere with the flow of potatoes to mar-
ket, and ultimately create a need for CCC to spend more in
order to maintain potato prices.25 It was not shown clearly
that either of these results would follow a breach of the sort
in the principal case; and, significantly, the court did not
rely upon these speculative items of pecuniary injury, but
centered on prospects of intangible injury.26
A penalty is a sum disproportionate to the damages that
could have been anticipated from a breach of the contract,
and which is agreed upon in order to enforce performance
of the main purpose of the contract, by the compulsion of
this very disproportion. A provision for a penalty is in-
valid by principles of general contract law. Among the
hallmarks of a penalty is the subjection of the offending
party to liability for the same amount whether the breach
is total or partial, or where the same sum is specified for
violation of any of several differing stipulations.2 7 Perhaps
13 The court stated, at 463: "In dealing with some matters pertain-
ing to government activities, the question of ascertaining how much
pecuniary loss is caused by failure of one contracting with the govern-
ment to keep his promise is especially difficult." See also, RESTATE-
MENT, CoNTRAcTs, §339, (1932) on which the court relied:
"(1) An agreement, made in advance of breach, fixing the damages
therefor, is not enforceable as a contract, and does not affect the dam-
ages recoverable for the breach, unless
(a) the amount so fixed Is a reasonable forecast of just compen-
sation for the harm that is caused by the breach, and
(b) the harm that is caused by the breach is one that is incapable
or very difficult of accurate estimation."
24 Supra, note 22.
Defendant's brief, pp. 12, 13.
S. upra, note 23. Testimony at the trial tended to indicate that the
result following defendant's breach would have been produced even
if there had been no breach. Defendant's brief, at 13.
0 Supra, note 22. See also, Note, 12 A.L.R.2d 130 at 133 (1950).
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this principle could be applied in the instant case, since the
same liability was imposed if defendant did any one of six
different acts, which appear to be of varying importance. 28
More important, it seems clear that the $3.00 per hundred-
weight stipulation was designed by its in terrorem effect to
compel performance.
It is said that penalty clauses are unenforceable because
such a punishment is unjust and unnecessary, and because
infliction of punishment is the function of society and not
of the individual.29 It is questionable whether such reasons
are valid here. The defendant entered the contract volun-
tarily, and its obligations were clearly stated. It had dealt
with CCC before and knew the nature of the contract, which
was a standard form.30
Moreover, if it is true that penalty clauses are unenforce-
able because punishment is the function, not of the indi-
vidual, but of society, it would seem that the government
corporation-which represents the social interest-is be-
yond the rationale of non-enforcement. And, since the
government has power to punish if it wishes, can it not be
argued that a penalty clause is, in part, defensible as in-
volving simply a means of exercising a clear authority?
Further, the unenforceability of a penalty clause is found-
ed, in part, on the assumption that an adequate remedy in
damages can be afforded by a court. And the same would
seem to be true as to the policy of not granting specific per-
formance in the ordinary commercial contract. However,
in some cases involving commercial contracts, damages alone
would not be adequate and so equitable relief is given. For
instance, cooperative marketing associations have been
able to obtain specific performance of contracts by members
21 Liquidated damages were called for in the event defendant did
any one of the following acts: (1) purchased ineligible potatoes;
(2) purchased potatoes of an ineligible grower; (3) paid less for pota-
toes than the applicable support price; (4) failed to comply with direc-
tions of CCC to withhold certain potatoes from market; (5) sold
ineligible potatoes belonging to another person; (6) sold potatoes be-
longing to an ineligible grower. Supra, note 1, at 461n.
2Supra, note 22.
8 Supra, note 1, at 463.
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where non-compliance might lead to disruption of the co-
operative's entire program.31 Similarly, in the principal
case, the failure to obtain compliance would disrupt the
program of an organization-in this instance, a government-
created organization. And so presumably, the government,
if it had known of the breach in time, could have obtained
a decree restraining violation of the contract. Should not
the government corporation also be able, by contractual
provision and the sanction of enforcible penalties, to guard
against the breach? In other words, since apparently in
this type of contract-because of the peculiar though in-
tangible interest of the government corporation-there is
no "right" to commit a breach of contract and pay damages
therefor, it seems just to allow the parties to use an in ter-
rorem stipulation to protect against breach. Especially is
this so, since, unlike the situation of private parties, the
use of such a power to exact penalties would be regulated,
not by individual conscience or lack of conscience, but by
an agency imbued with governmental responsibility.
Thus, it seems to the writer that the courts would do well
to admit that, while the "liquidated damages" provisions
in government contracts may, in view of their in terrorem
purpose, come within the traditional definition of a penalty,
they are nevertheless enforceable because of the peculiar
interest of the government as a party.
" See: PACKEL, THE LAW OF THE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF
COOPERATIVES (2d.Ed. 1947) at 156, and cases cited at note 46. At page
155: "More significant than the uncertainty of damages is the fact that
the whole program of the cooperative may be destroyed and rendered
abortive if such contracts are not carried out." Compare analogy pre-
sented in Note, 50 YALE L.J. 1056, at 1065,1066 (1941).
